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If all of our memories were strong and vivid, then decid-
ing whether or not something occurred in the past would 
be straightforward. But many of our memories are vague 
and uncertain, making it difficult to separate events that 
we truly experienced from events that, although plau-
sible, never actually occurred. To separate fact from fic-
tion in our memories, we need to establish a threshold 
for how strong a memory needs to feel before we are 
willing to accept that the memory is real. This threshold, 
or criterion, can range from lax, in which we accept 
memories on the basis of relatively weak or vague evi-
dence, to strict, in which a memory must be very strong 
before we accept it as a legitimate record of the past.
The decision criterion is a crucial influence on the 
decisions people make and, by extension, the outcomes 
they experience. Indeed, neither one’s memory acuity 
nor the strength of a given memory, considered in isola-
tion from the decision criterion, tells one how that mem-
ory will be classified and subsequently used to direct 
behavior. In this review, we highlight the importance of 
understanding humans’ willingness to strategically adapt 
a decision criterion as circumstances warrant.
Strategically Adapting a Criterion to 
Suit the Situation
In a typical recognition-memory experiment, partici-
pants are presented with a series of items (e.g., words, 
pictures) and on a later test are asked to discriminate 
between these previously encountered (“old”) items 
and “new” items that were not part of the initial list. 
Thus, on each test trial, individuals must judge whether 
the strength of their memory for an item surpasses their 
criterion for calling the item “old” (these assumptions 
are formalized in signal detection theory; Parks, 1966; 
see Fig. 1). Recent demonstrations of stable individual 
differences in criterion use suggest that a focus on 
tendencies inherent to the recognizer is critical for 
understanding these decisions. Kantner and Lindsay 
(2012, 2014) showed that on recognition tests contain-
ing equal numbers of old and new items and no incen-
tives for biasing responses, there is still wide variation 
in criterion placement across participants that is stable 
across time, differences in stimulus materials, and test-
ing situations. Thus, one’s standard of evidence for 
responding “old” appears to be akin to a cognitive trait. 
In other words, some people tend to be quite strict (or 
conservative) with memory evidence, whereas others 
tend to be quite lax (or liberal), with most people fall-
ing somewhere in between.
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Abstract
Decisions are often based on memory, but memories are often vague and ambiguous. Therefore, one must establish 
some standard for how strong a memory must feel before it is accepted as part of one’s past. This standard of evidence, 
called a decision criterion, should be adapted to the demands of a given situation: Sometimes it is critical to accept 
only strong memories as legitimate, whereas at other times it is more appropriate to act on the basis of relatively weak 
memory evidence. The ability to shift between these two standards as circumstances warrant is a critical element of 
successful decision making. We review recent work examining criterion shifting in recognition memory and argue that 
the true nature of criterion shifting may be seen only at the individual level: Whereas some people shift their criterion 
quite adaptively, others do not shift at all.
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However, few situations in life present an equal 
probability or equal subjective valuations of the various 
decision outcomes. Importantly, the placement of a 
criterion should depend on the situation, not necessar-
ily on a person’s general tendency. For example, police 
officers recognizing an escaped felon making a menac-
ing move toward his pocket during an otherwise rou-
tine traffic stop should not fire their weapons at the 
felon unless they are extremely confident in 
their memory in order to avoid shooting a potentially 
innocent person reaching for his wallet. Likewise, a 
doctor who sees a patient with unusual symptoms may 
want to adopt a very lax criterion when trying to remem-
ber previous cases with similar symptoms: The memo-
ries may be weak and lead to fruitless searches through 
case files, but the chance of missing a critical sign of 
disease may be minimized. The willingness to adapt 
one’s standard of evidence to the demands of a 
situation—to criterion shift—is critical for good decision 
making.
Researchers have identified experimental manipula-
tions that can reliably and robustly induce subjects to 
adopt a different criterion without affecting their dis-
crimination ability, including revealing the base rate of 
old items, creating uneven monetary payoffs and penal-
ties for “old” versus “new” responses, or simply warning 
subjects to avoid either misses (incorrect “new” judg-
ments) or false alarms (incorrect “old” judgments; see 
Hockley, 2011, for a review). Recent research has exam-
ined various properties of criterion shifting, including 
the amount of effort that may be necessary to adapt a 
criterion (North, Olfman, Caldera, Munoz, & Light, 2018; 
Starns & Olchowski, 2015).
Some People Just Do Not Shift at All
However, one thing that has not been appreciated until 
recently is this: Not all subjects will shift their criteria 
in response to these inducements (Aminoff et al., 2012; 
Frithsen, Kantner, Lopez, & Miller, 2018; Kantner, Vettel, 
& Miller, 2015). Some people shift their criteria well in 
response to these manipulations, whereas others do 
not shift at all. In a study by Aminoff and colleagues 
(2012), 95 subjects completed recognition tests in which 
the base rate of old items alternated between 30% and 
70% across blocks, requiring shifts between strict and 
lax criteria (respectively) to maximize the proportion 
of correct responses. Figure 2a displays the range of 
criterion shifts across subjects. In response to the 
known changes in the base rate of old items, some 
subjects appropriately shifted between two extreme 
criteria (two example subjects are shown on the far 
left). Other subjects, regardless of whether they were 
naturally conservative or liberal, did not shift at all (two 
example subjects are shown on the far right). Critically, 
these trends do not simply represent random variation 
across subjects, because subjects were consistent in 
their criterion shifting across multiple tests. The mag-
nitude of participants’ criterion shifts on a word-recog-
nition test strongly predicted those on a face-recognition 
test (r = .58; see Fig. 2b). There appears to be some-
thing systematic and uniquely individualistic about the 
variations in criterion shifting.
Liberal, or Lax, Criterion
for Memory Evidence
Conservative, or Strict, Criterion
for Memory Evidence
Fig. 1. A standard signal detection model of recognition memory. 
All studied and nonstudied items will be normally distributed along 
a continuum of memory strength. Even nonstudied items will vary 
in memory strength, with some seeming more familiar than others. 
The criterion (indicated by the vertical arrows) represents the point 
along that continuum at which one decides the memory is strong 
enough to respond “old.” Correctly responding “old” to a studied 
item is considered a hit (H), whereas incorrectly responding “old” 
to a nonstudied item is considered a false alarm (FA). Correctly 
responding “new” to a nonstudied item is considered a correct rejec-
tion (CR), whereas incorrectly responding “new” to a studied item 
is considered a miss (M). If the goal is to avoid missing any studied 
items, then an individual should adopt a lax criterion (top panel), 
which will minimize the number of misses at the risk of increasing 
the number of false alarms. If the goal is to avoid calling a nonstudied 
item “old,” then an individual should adopt a strict criterion (bottom 
panel), which will minimize the number of false alarms at the risk 
of increasing the number of misses.
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Further studies have demonstrated that recognition-
criterion flexibility generalizes across criterion manipula-
tions (Kantner et al., 2015; though see Franks & Hicks, 
2016). It also generalizes to domains outside of recognition 
memory. We recently found significant correlations 
between criterion shifting on tests of recognition memory 
and criterion shifting on tests of visual detection and dis-
crimination (Frithsen et al., 2018).
One of the more interesting properties of criterion 
shifting is that people appear to suboptimally place 
their criteria. That is, regardless of their ability to dis-
criminate old items from new, people are generally not 
strict enough when it benefits them to avoid false 
alarms or lax enough when avoiding misses is more 
beneficial (see Fig. 2a). This criterion suboptimality 
(sometimes called conservatism, an unfortunate term 
given that strict criteria are also usually called conserva-
tive) appears quite resilient even in extreme situations. 
In Kantner et  al. (2015, Experiment 3), subjects in a 
control condition attempted to identify studied suspects 
in a simulated security patrol. They were given strong 
instructions to avoid false alarms at all costs in one 
scenario (strict-criterion condition) and to avoid misses 
at all costs in another scenario (lax-criterion condition). 
As is typically found, most subjects were not nearly as 
strict as they should have been when asked to minimize 
false alarms, nor were they as lax as needed when 
asked to minimize misses. In the experimental condi-
tion, subjects were given the same suspect-recognition 
task but with no preceding study phase (because of a 
“malfunction”). In this case, one might expect that with 
no diagnostic memory evidence on which to base their 
judgments, subjects would base their decisions solely 
on the instructions to avoid false alarms or misses. 
Indeed, a small proportion of subjects did so, shifting 
between appropriately extreme criteria, but many more 
did not, including many of the same subjects who 
shifted poorly or not at all in the control condition.
Several explanations for criterion suboptimality have 
been put forward over the years, including subjects’ 
attempts to align their responses with the base rates of 
targets and lures (probability matching; Thomas & 
Legge, 1970), trial-to-trial noise in criterion placement 
(Benjamin, Diaz, & Wee, 2009), and the failure to esti-
mate one or more of three environmental factors: target 
base rates, the costs and benefits of outcomes, and the 
confusability of targets and lures (Lynn & Barrett, 2014). 
We argue that none of these explanations can provide 
a complete account of shifting behaviors, however, 
because they were tested on performance that was 
averaged across a group of subjects. Although these 
group-level accounts likely offer explanations for why 
some individuals fall short of the optimal criterion (and 
some may constitute individual-differences factors in 
themselves, though they have not been investigated in 
that way), they fail to consider the consistent perfor-
mance of individuals at the extreme ends of the crite-
rion-shifting continuum. Indeed, the idea that people 
are suboptimal criterion shifters is a generalization that 
masks the subject-level factors that appear to drive 
memory decision making. We believe the question 
should be why some people approach optimality in 
shifting their criteria and other people simply do not 
shift at all.
The Consequences of Not Shifting
An optimal criterion maximizes the number of positive 
outcomes (e.g., accurate responses, payoffs, avoidance 
of critical errors) given the ability of the subject to 
discriminate between studied items and nonstudied 
items: The lower the ability to discriminate, the more 
extreme the optimal criterion becomes (Green & 
Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2004). The conse-
quences of not shifting a criterion are highly evident. 
Figure 2c depicts data from an individual (No. 80) 
Fig. 2. Results from Aminoff and colleagues (2012). The graphs in (a) show the tendency of 95 subjects to shift criterion between a conservative 
condition (low probability of a target) and a liberal condition (high probability of a target) in a word-recognition task and a face-recognition task. 
Results are normalized for differences in discrimination (d′) and are sorted from the best shifters (to the left) and the worst shifters (to the right) 
on the task in question. The ordering of subjects in the face-recognition task is based on their criterion-shift ordering in the word-recognition 
task to give a sense of the consistency of criterion shifting within individuals across tasks. The thick bars to the left represent the group averages, 
with error bars representing standard errors of the mean. Note that only one individual reached the optimal criterion in both the conservative 
and liberal conditions of one task: The highest shifter in the word-recognition task exceeded the optimal criterion in the conservative condi-
tion (indicated by the upper horizontal line) and the optimal criterion in the liberal condition (indicated by the lower horizontal line). Many 
individuals did not shift at all. The scatterplots (b; with best-fitting regression lines) show the correlation between (left) criterion shifting in the 
word- and face-recognition tasks and (right) discrimination (d′) in the word- and face-recognition tasks. The bar charts (c) show the consequences 
of not shifting. Data were derived from the same study as depicted in (a)—but note that the criterion values in (a) are normalized, whereas the 
criterion values in (c) are not. The proportion of misses (Ms) and false alarms (FAs), along with d′ and the criterion value (given as c), is shown 
separately for 4 individual subjects when target probability was low and when target probability was high. The proportion of misses and false 
alarms should increase or decrease in response to changes in the base rate of old items, as it did for the two good shifters (Nos. 16 and 30). The 
broken line represents the optimal overall proportion of errors at that given discrimination level, and the solid line represents the actual overall 
proportion of errors. Good shifters do not necessarily need to be optimal in the placement of their criteria. They simply need to shift their criteria 
enough in response to the changes in the base rate of old items to minimize their overall proportion of errors, regardless of their discrimination 
ability. Poor shifters do not strategically respond to changes in the base rate of old items or do so to such a small extent that their proportion 
of errors is much higher than it should be. The two poor shifters (Nos. 51 and 80) had a higher proportion of errors—despite higher levels of 
discrimination—than the good shifters because they did not strategically shift their criteria, remaining either liberal or conservative despite the 
known changes in the base rate of old items (as shown by the colored area between the solid and dashed lines).
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whose recognition decisions tended to be so conserva-
tive that this person almost reached the optimal crite-
rion when the probability of an old item was low 
(Aminoff et al., 2012). But this same subject failed to 
shift that criterion to a more liberal setting when cor-
rectly informed that the recognition test switched to a 
high-target probability condition—that is, the test items 
were then much more likely to be old. Because of this 
failure to criterion shift, this subject had a much higher 
proportion of errors on the test than a different subject 
(No. 16) whose discrimination ability was actually much 
worse but who almost optimally criterion shifted. Thus, 
this failure to criterion shift is a lost opportunity for 
correct responses that can undermine a good memory. 
Conversely, proper criterion shifting can support a 
weak memory by producing positive outcomes even 
when memory evidence cannot be relied on.
The failure to criterion shift can also have real-life 
consequences. As noted, some individuals tend to be 
quite strict about accepting memories as veridical, 
allowing them to avoid false alarms. When such people 
fail to adjust this strategy in situations that call for a 
more lenient criterion, they may miss something sig-
nificant, such as when a truck driver fails to take a 
turnoff that seems familiar or a radiologist fails to flag 
a spot on a patient’s chest X-ray because it seems only 
vaguely similar to examples of cancerous tumors stored 
in memory. Analogously, individuals who are inherently 
lax in accepting memories can commit highly conse-
quential false alarms if they do not shift their criterion 
in situations that call for a more conservative strategy, 
such as when a witness to a crime falsely identifies a 
member of a lineup on the basis of a facial feature 
shared with the culprit.
The question of appropriate criterion use by eyewit-
nesses has important implications for policymakers and 
for society at large (Wixted & Wells, 2017). Mickes and 
colleagues (2017) recently published a fascinating study 
in which subjects witnessed a mock videotaped crime. 
Later, the subjects were asked to identify the culprit in 
the video out of a lineup, knowing that the suspect was 
not necessarily in the lineup. After making their deci-
sions, subjects were asked to rate the confidence of 
their choices from 0% (not sure at all) to 100% (abso-
lutely confident). Subjects’ choices at the 100% confi-
dence level produced extremely few false identifications. 
However, an entirely different group of subjects was 
instructed to identify a suspect only if they were 100% 
confident in their choice; in other words, to be as strict 
with their recognition criterion as possible to avoid 
falsely identifying an innocent person at all costs. These 
subjects were indeed generally conservative with their 
choices but not nearly as conservative as they should 
have been, leading to a much higher false-identification 
rate than in the former group of subjects using that 
same 100% confidence level. In our interpretation of 
the data, a number of subjects in the latter group failed 
to shift to a more conservative criterion despite the 
instructions to do so. Individual differences in criterion 
placement on recognition-memory tests have been 
shown to predict the rate of false identifications on cul-
prit-absent lineups and could potentially be used as part 
of a test for assessing eyewitness decisions (Baldassari, 
Kantner, & Lindsay, 2019; Kantner & Lindsay, 2014).
The Willingness to Criterion Shift
What are the characteristics of a good criterion shifter? 
Whereas some studies have suggested factors that may 
predict criterion placement and shifting, including age 
(Cassidy & Gutchess, 2015), sensitivity to the strength 
of one’s own memories (Selmeczy & Dobbins, 2013), 
and social cues (Cassidy, Dubé, & Gutchess, 2015), 
what may be more notable are all the factors that do 
not predict criterion shifting. These include measures 
of intelligence and executive-functioning skills such as 
working memory capacity and task-switching ability, as 
reported by Aminoff and colleagues (2012) in a large-
scale study of individual differences that included 95 
subjects. Indeed, as the Mickes et al. (2017) study dem-
onstrates, people are capable of determining what a 
100% confidence judgment should entail; they simply 
fail to apply that criterion appropriately when instructed 
to do so. On the basis of that same large-scale study 
by Aminoff and colleagues (2012), we suggest that good 
criterion shifting also does not appear to be strongly 
related to any personality traits. Though there is still 
much work needed to identify the characteristics of 
good criterion shifters, the driving factor may be the 
willingness to shift rather than the ability to shift.
Interestingly, the degree to which an individual shifts 
a criterion does not appear to be related to the range 
of confidence levels that same individual might use on 
a recognition test. Collecting a confidence rating for 
old/new recognition judgments is a common method 
used to construct receiver-operating-characteristic 
curves, in which each confidence rating available to 
participants is thought to reflect the use of a separate 
criterion. Given this assumed relationship, one might 
expect that an individual who consistently does not 
shift a criterion would use a very limited range of con-
fidence ratings. For this article (based on a suggestion 
by John Wixted), we reanalyzed some data we collected 
on 10 tests of recognition memory, visual discrimina-
tion, and visual detection, each including criterion 
manipulations and the collection of confidence ratings 
on each old/new judgment (Frithsen et al., 2018). Of 
these 10 tests, only 1 indicated a significant relationship 
between the magnitude of a participant’s criterion shift 
and the spread of the participant’s confidence ratings 
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(a small correlation of .26 on a recognition test using 
a payoff manipulation). More systematic studies will 
need to be conducted on this relationship, but it would 
appear that people are capable of establishing appro-
priately extreme criterion levels (by rating their confi-
dence level), but some of these people are just unwilling 
to use them when instructed or induced to do so.
The unwillingness to shift may stem from a prefer-
ence to make judgments using memory evidence—even 
when it is inconclusive—rather than defaulting to a 
criterion-based decision rule. In their 1966 book on 
signal detection theory, Green and Swets noted of sen-
sory discriminations that “the observer tends to avoid 
extreme criteria” and “probably finds it difficult to 
believe that he would be performing responsibly if the 
sensory distinctions he makes are exactly those that he 
could make by removing the earphones in an auditory 
experiment or by turning his back on a visual signal” 
(p. 91). As we found, even in the absence of a study 
phase, many subjects were unwilling to make decisions 
solely on the basis of the base rate of targets or the 
instructions to avoid false alarms or misses (Kantner 
et al., 2015). In debriefings following the study, many 
subjects said they based decisions on some sense of 
familiarity even though they knew there was no basis for 
doing so. As we noted at the time, it is as if “people would 
rather attempt to be correct than be correctly biased” 
(Kantner et al., 2015, General Discussion, para. 3).
Conclusion
Recent findings strongly support an individual-
differences approach to understanding the dynamics of 
criterion use and their broad implications for decision 
making. A critical direction for future research, we 
believe, is to identify the cognitive, neural, and moti-
vational factors that lead one person to adopt appropri-
ate standards of memory evidence and another person 
to remain either too lax or too strict. Further insight 
into these factors will drive theory development in 
memory and decision making and help explain—and 
perhaps improve—human decision making at the level 
of the individual.
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